The optimal reaction to a productivity shock which becomes more imminent with global warming is to price carbon (proportional to the marginal hazard of a catastrophe) to curb the risk of climate change, but also to accumulate precautionary capital to facilitate smoothing of consumption and curb the adverse effects of the calamity on the economy. We allow for conventional marginal climate damages as well and decompose the optimal carbon price in two catastrophe components and a conventional component. Moreover, the productivity catastrophe is compared with recoverable catastrophes and with a shock to the temperature response.
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Introduction
Global warming calls for a global price of carbon corresponding to the present value of all future marginal damages arising from emitting one ton of carbon (e.g., Nordhaus, 2008; Stern, 2007; Golosov et al., 2014) . Although it is acknowledged that there may be catastrophic damages associated with global warming, the problem is usually resolved by assuming convex damages 1 . Our main contribution is to investigate the consequences for climate policy of a pending non-marginal calamity which becomes more imminent with global warming. Uncertainty about the time, impact and type of such a climate catastrophe is a key feature of our analysis. We show that the economy needs to react in two ways to such catastrophes. First, carbon needs to be priced (via a global carbon tax or emissions market) to curb the risk of climate calamities as the hazard of a catastrophe increases with global mean temperature or the stock of atmospheric carbon. Second, precautionary saving is needed to cope with the chance of an abrupt downward drop in consumption at some point in the future.
Policy must thus deal with the possibility of large, abrupt and persistent changes in the climate system, called regime shifts in the ecological literature (e.g. Biggs et al., 2012) .
A point where such a regime shift occurs is called a tipping point. The idea that the prime role of climate policy is to deal with a small risk of abrupt and often irreversible climate disasters and tipping points at high temperatures rather than internalizing smooth global warming damages at low and moderate temperatures is gaining traction (e.g., Lenton and Ciscar, 2013; Kopits et al., 2013; Pindyck, 2013) . These sudden shifts in damage might show up as shocks to total factor productivity arising from flooding of cities, sudden increased occurrence of storms and droughts, abrupt desertification of agricultural land, or reversal of the Gulf Stream and change in the thermohaline circulation (e.g., Alley et al., 2003) .
Another example of a regime shift is a sudden acceleration of global warming associated with a reduction in cooling when ice sheets such as the Western Antarctic
Ice Sheet melt away (e.g., Oppenheimer, 1988) . 2 A related example occurs if rising sea temperatures and sea levels trigger the sudden release of methane buried in sea-beds and permafrost (e.g., Dutta et al., 2006) . 3 Since methane is itself a powerful (albeit shorter lived) greenhouse gas, release of it increases global warming and sets in motion further destabilization. Such tips can induce positive feedback in the carbon cycle; we view them as a sudden increase in the climate sensitivity or stock of greenhouse gases.
We also highlight how the optimal response depends on what type of catastrophe one has to deal with, how imminent it is, and how sensitive the arrival time is to changes in global warming. We analyse capital accumulation and fossil fuel use in a Ramsey growth model where global warming makes a regime shift more imminent. We start with the possibility that a catastrophe might trigger a sudden drop in total factor productivity. We show that the economy then aims for a higher steady-state stock of capital than without an imminent disaster. This precaution facilitates consumption smoothing over the whole time horizon. Since the hazard of a regime shift increases with the stock of greenhouse gases, it is optimal to price carbon in order to curb emissions and the probability of a regime shift. We show that the marginal hazard of a catastrophe plays a key role in setting the carbon price.
We offer expressions for the precautionary return on capital and the optimal price of carbon. We also give simulation results both before and after the catastrophe based on a calibrated Ramsey model of the global economy with catastrophic climate shocks.
We extend our core analysis in three directions. First, we allow for gradual marginal climate damages as in the integrated climate assessment literature (e.g., Tol, 2002; Nordhaus, 2008; Stern, 2007; Golosov et al., 2014) . We show that the optimal carbon price consists of a catastrophe component and the usual component internalizing marginal damages. The catastrophe component consists of a risk-averting part and a raising-the-stakes part, where the latter equals the expected present value of future increases in after-calamity welfare from curbing carbon emissions with one unit.
Second, we derive the optimal response to a catastrophic, sudden increase in climate sensitivity. Global warming after the tip then becomes more severe (for the productivity shock the opposite occurs as economic activity and carbon emissions fall 3 after a productivity tip). Third, we consider the implications of recoverable catastrophes such as a sudden rise in the carbon stock or destruction of part of capital.
Our contribution is to emphasize the need for precautionary capital as well as an appropriate carbon price in the face of tipping points driven by global warming in a transparent framework. The previous literature has attended to the hazard of climate catastrophes but does not provide the full picture. Clarke and Reed (1994) , Tsur and Zemel (1996) and Gjerde et al. (1999) analyse catastrophes with hazard rates, but they adopt a partial equilibrium perspective and do not have Ramsey growth and thus no need for precautionary capital accumulation. Gjerde et al. (1999) consider carbon cycle and temperature modules with gradual and catastrophic damages and provide detailed simulation studies of the effects of pending catastrophes on temperature and the economy, but do not focus on the optimal price of carbon or the need for precautionary saving. Smulders et al. (2014) do discuss the need for precautionary saving to deal with an impending disaster, but their analysis uses a constant hazard rate whereas our analysis highlights temperature-dependent hazard rates for climate policy. Engström and Gars (2014) study catastrophes within the model of Golosov et al. (2014) , but the special assumptions needed to get a tractable solution of this model remove the incentive to have precautionary saving to cope with a pending catastrophe. Keller et al. (2004) study the combined effects of a climate threshold, a potential ocean thermohaline circulation collapse and learning in the DICE model, an integrated assessment model for climate change (Nordhaus, 2008) . Cai et al. (2012) , Lontzek et al. (2014) and Lemoine and Traeger (2014) extend the DICE model to numerically analyse the effect of tipping points on the optimal carbon tax. Cai et al. (2012) and Lontzek et al. (2014) use a hazard rate for an upward shift in the damage function whilst Lemoine and Traeger (2014) consider a temperature threshold that is uncertain and add learning by formulating a hazard rate that is zero at temperature levels that have proven to be safe. Our study focuses on theory first to highlight the need for precautionary saving as well as pricing carbon, and then presents illustrative quantitative results in a simple calibrated model of the world economy.
Other studies have focused on catastrophes and extreme events but not in the context of general equilibrium models of Ramsey growth and climate change. Barro (2013) 4 studies the optimal investment needed to curb the probability of an environmental disaster but abstracts from precautionary accumulation of capital. Weitzman (2007) highlights the fundamental uncertainty at the upper end of the probability distribution of possible increases in temperature and corresponding damage, and shows that the policy consequences of a fat instead of a thin tail can be dramatic. Martin and Pindyck (2014) study the 'strange' implications for cost-benefit analysis of a cascade of catastrophes within a partial equilibrium context. Pindyck and Wang (2013) use a general equilibrium framework to obtain a price of insurance against catastrophic risks.
Section 2 presents our model of growth with tipping points and only catastrophic damages. Section 3 shows that the optimal response requires precautionary capital accumulation and, if the hazard increases with atmospheric carbon, pricing carbon to curb the risk of tipping. It also shows the effects of intergenerational inequality aversion. Section 4 allows for gradual as well as catastrophic damages from global warming and decomposes the optimal carbon tax into the usual social cost of carbon (i.e., the present value of marginal gradual damages) and the extra tax that is needed to curb the risk of climate tipping. It also discusses regime shifts with a sudden increase in climate sensitivity and recoverable catastrophes that destroy part of the capital stock or lead to a sudden release of atmospheric carbon. Section 5 concludes.
Ramsey growth with climate tipping: only catastrophic damages
Consider a continuous-time Ramsey growth model with constant population. Fossil fuel E is input into the production process, has constant marginal cost d > 0, and (given abundance of coal and shale gas) is in abundant supply. There is a carbon-free imperfect substitute for fossil fuel R, renewable energy, with constant cost c > 0.
Capital K, fossil fuel and the renewable substitute are cooperative factors of production. Total factor productivity is A before the regime shift and drops to We assume that the magnitude of the potential drop in total factor productivity is known but that it is not known when the climate regime shift will take place. The hazard rate h gives the conditional probability of the tipping point T. Formally, 
,
with total factor productivity given by 4 About a fifth of carbon emissions remain in the atmosphere for thousands of years or forever, but in contrast to Golosov et al. (2014) we suppose that all of it decays eventually. We also ignore temperature lags, but see Gerlagh and Liski (2012) for that. Our calibration of (3) below is close to that of the seminal contribution of Nordhaus (1991) , who uses  = 0.5 and  = 0.005. We set  = 0.5 and  = 0.003.
where the tipping point T is driven by the hazard rate H(P).
We solve this problem by backward induction. After the climate regime shift, the problem is a standard Ramsey growth model with total factor productivity (1 )A   .
The maximum level of output net of input costs and capital depreciation increases with the capital stock and decreases with the size of the climate disaster:
For brevity, we suppress the arguments A, c and d in the net output function but 
The after-calamity Ramsey problem yields the manifold for
 (see Appendix 1 for details).
Precautionary actions needed before the regime shift
The before-tip problem is to choose the rate of consumption and energy use in order to
subject to the capital and carbon stock dynamics (3). The question is how the prospect of a climate regime shift and the fact that this prospect becomes more imminent as temperature and atmospheric carbon rise affect the optimal growth path before the tip occurs. We denote before-event values with superscript B. Since atmospheric carbon increases the hazard rate, () HP, the before-tip value function ( , ) B V K P depends on P. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the before-tip problem is then
with the optimality conditions
where the social cost of carbon is the marginal disvalue of carbon emissions expressed in final goods units:
The second term on the right-hand side of (7) captures the expected capitalized loss from a regime shift that occurs at some unknown future date. With a zero hazard rate, the standard Ramsey growth model results, but with total factor productivity equal to
A. This is the naive solution, since the potential regime shift is effectively ignored.
We define (.)
as the maximum level of output net of total input costs and capital depreciation that can be attained given the capital stock and the costs of energy:
so that the efficiency conditions for energy use are
 The cost of fossil fuel is thus augmented with the social cost of carbon. If carbon is priced at the social cost of carbon, this condition for the social optimum is replicated in the market. Differentiating (7) with respect to K and P using (8) gives the Pontryagin conditions:
Using (9) and (11), we get a differential equation for the price of carbon τ:
Using the first parts of (11) and (8), we get the modified Keynes-Ramsey rule
Consumption growth is thus proportional to the marginal net product of capital plus the precautionary return  minus the pure rate of time preference.
With a constant hazard, '( ) 0, HP the pre-tip value does not depend on the carbon stock and τ = 0, so that the social optimum only requires precautionary saving and no carbon tax. With '( ) 0 HP , there is a positive price of carbon τ to encourage substitution away from fossil fuel.
The accumulation of capital and the stock of carbon can be written as
.
The capital dynamics include lump-sum rebates of carbon taxes in a market economy.
The steady state of (12) K to be prepared for a possible tip but the optimal price of carbon τ B* pushes it down again to reduce the risk.
The precautionary return on capital
6 For simplicity, we suppress the dependence of the value functions on  from now on.
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The precautionary return on capital  defined in (13) 
tipping, consumption is then higher and capital accumulation lower than in the naive outcome (cf. Polasky et al., 2011) . However, with life after the shock, discounting increases but this is more than offset by the precautionary effect, so  > 0.
The price of carbon
The optimal price of carbon depends on the marginal hazard of a calamity. The rationale for carbon pricing is thus different from most integrated assessment models (see Section 4). Integration of (12) gives the optimal carbon price as the present value of the expected loss in welfare from a future disaster at some unknown date: depresses it (via the higher discount rate).
Simulations with temperature-dependent hazard rates
To illustrate these results, we assume that at the initial carbon stock, P0 = 826 GtC, the hazard rate is H(826) = 0.025 and that it increases to H(1652) = 0.067. So, as the stock of atmospheric carbon doubles and global warming increases by 3 degrees Celsius (using a climate sensitivity of 3), the average time it takes for the tip to occur drops from 40 to 15 years. We calibrate both a linear and a quadratic hazard function: The quadratic hazard has a higher target carbon tax so that the target carbon stock is cut substantially below that with the linear hazard (1281 instead of 1623 GtC). As a result, the corresponding hazard under the quadratic specification is lower (3.8 instead of 6.5 percent per annum) and the target precautionary return on capital is lower under the quadratic than under the linear hazard (0.99 versus 1.24 percent per annum).
Hence, the target before-catastrophe steady-state capital stock is only 486 trillion dollars whilst under the linear hazard it is 530 trillion dollars. In both cases the target precautionary return on capital is higher than with a constant hazard rate (0.76 percent per annum) and hence, the target capital stock is higher. The reason is that the higher probability of a tip increases the target level of precautionary capital accumulation.
With the quadratic hazard the marginal hazard rate is slightly larger at the target level of the carbon stock than with the linear hazard (H2(1281) = 5.5610 -5 > H1(1623) = 5.0410 -5 ). 8 This pushes up the carbon tax. Since the hazard rate itself is lower with the quadratic hazard and thus the discount rate used to calculate the present value of the drop in value after a calamity is lower, the carbon tax is further pushed up.
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The optimal time paths of capital, consumption and the accumulated carbon stock for the linear and quadratic hazard functions are plotted in figure 2. With global warming the hazard rates go up and expected time of the regime shift is brought forward. This is especially the case for the linear hazard rate and thus precautionary saving is higher to mitigate the effect of the shock. Hence, consumption is lower in the beginning and only catches up if the regime shift happens to occur late. In case of a quadratic hazard function, the hazard rate goes up more slowly in the relevant range. Moreover, the high carbon tax keeps the stock of atmospheric carbon down. The expected date of the regime shift occurs later than for the linear hazard rate and precautionary saving is not as high. If the linear hazard function is the more realistic one, substantial precautionary saving and a moderate carbon tax are required. If the quadratic hazard function is the more realistic one, precautionary saving is lower 9 but a higher carbon tax is required.
For both hazard functions fossil fuel use is less after than before the calamity as a result of a lower level of economic activity (even though the carbon is no longer priced) and thus carbon accumulation occurs less rapidly.
Risk aversion and intergenerational inequality aversion
Much attention has been given to the role of time preference for precautionary climate policy. It has been argued that this should not be deduced from market outcomes but from ethical considerations (e.g., Stern, 2007; Broome, 2012) or prudence considerations resulting from a positive third derivative of the utility function (e.g., Kimball, 1990; Gollier, 2012) . We put forward another rationale which results from the need to be better prepared when a large-scale climate shock with an uncertain arrival time eventually hits the world.
Another important parameter indicating society's attitude to intergenerational welfare comparisons is the coefficient of relative intergenerational inequality aversion (CRIA) which is also the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA). A higher elasticity of substitution σ corresponds to both a lower CRIA and a lower CRRA and thus has two effects. A higher elasticity of substitution σ induces a lower precautionary return θ (as in equations (13)) and thus less precautionary capital accumulation. Effectively, 9 For much more convex hazard functions precautionary saving can be swamped completely, so capital is lower than in the naive outcome to curb fossil fuel emissions and global warming.
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Figure 2: Rational outcomes with linear and quadratic hazard functions
14 society has a lower CRIA and is therefore less willing to sacrifice consumption and accumulate precautionary capital to be prepared for the eventual shock. As a result of using less capital in production, there will be less use of fossil fuel and thus carbon emissions will be lower. This yields a lower price of carbon. Furthermore, a lower CRRA implies that society is less willing to avert risk of a climate catastrophe and this depresses the price of carbon and the carbon tax τ too. The net effect on the stock of atmospheric carbon is ambiguous, since a lower CRIA induces less precautionary capital accumulation and thus less fossil fuel use and carbon emissions whereas a lower CRRA reduces the optimal price of carbon which means that carbon emissions are reduced less and the carbon stock is higher.
To illustrate these arguments, we increase the elasticity of intertemporal substitution GtC under the quadratic hazard function. Less intergenerational inequality aversion curbs the target rate of consumption, but only by a very modest amount.
Ramsey growth with climate tipping: gradual and catastrophic damages
In most IAMs global mean temperature Temp decreases total factor productivity in gradual fashion. Nordhaus (2008) where  = 0.02379 US$/tC is the damage coefficient, P the 2010 stock of carbon, and A total factor productivity in 2010.
With these additional gradual damages, the social cost of carbon is (see Appendix 3):
risk-averting part of the price of carbon ( ') '
conventional part of the price of carb 
raising-the stakes part of the price of carbon
The first term is the present value of the expected loss of a future climate catastrophe.
It curbs carbon emissions and thus the risk of a climate calamity. The second term is the usual present value of marginal climate damages with the discount rate being the rate of interest plus decay rate of atmospheric carbon augmented with the hazard of the catastrophe plus the precautionary return. 10 The third term is the expected present value of future increases in after-calamity welfare from curbing emissions by one unit.
Decomposing the social cost of carbon and the precautionary return on capital
The first three columns of The remaining columns of table 2 show the consequences of a catastrophic drop of 10 percent in total factor productivity. Since there is more economic activity and more 10 With logarithmic utility, Cobb-Douglas production and 100% depreciation, this part of the SCC in a discrete-time Ramsey model is proportional to GDP, / ( ) AF      (Golosov et al., 2014) .
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carbon emissions after the calamity than with the 20 percent disaster, the aftercalamity price of carbon increases from 11 to 13 $/tCO2. Before the calamity strikes, both risk-averting components of the optimal price of carbon fall relative to the outcome with a 20 percent calamity but the biggest falls occur for the risk-averting components (from 35 to 12 $/tCO2 for the linear and from 52 to 24 $/tCO2 for the quadratic hazard function). Although there is more economic activity with a 10%
shock after the calamity, the initial capital stock is lower because there is less precautionary capital accumulation. The precautionary return drops more or less in line with the drop in total factor productivity, so that less precautionary saving occurs before the calamity. Despite the lower initial capital stock after the calamity, the lower structural drop of only 10% in total factor productivity leads to bigger carbon stocks and more global warming.
In brackets we show how results change if the quadratic hazard rates are halved for each level of the carbon stock. This curbs precautionary saving, but increases the price of carbon by a small amount. The marginal hazard rates are lower but the hazard rates are lower also and the last effect dominates so the carbon price increases. 
Carbon and capital catastrophes
Instead of an economic catastrophe triggered by global warming we consider here a climate catastrophe which induces an abrupt increase in the climate sensitivity .
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After the disaster the carbon stock and temperature increase and gradually erode productivity (see Appendix 4). Table 3 shows the effects of a catastrophic increase in the climate sensitivity from 3 to 4 with a quadratic hazard. 13 The after-calamity response requires a much higher carbon price than in the naive outcome (27 instead of 16 $/tCO2). Before the calamity also a substantial target carbon price is needed (27 $/tCO2); not different from the after-calamity carbon price, but there is a shift from 11 With a linear hazard (not reported in table 2) there is still substantial precautionary capital accumulation after halving hazard rates (437 T$). The carbon price is a little higher for the linear (77.2 $/tCO2) than for the quadratic hazard, mainly due to the risk-averting component as the marginal hazard for the linear is higher than for the quadratic hazard ( 55 2.52 10 1.78 10
The interplay between marginal hazard and the hazard rate itself can work out in different ways but it is clear that a big price of carbon is needed to curb the risk of catastrophe. 12 An alternative is to have abrupt positive feedback by changing the system dynamics of the carbon cycle as discussed in Lemoine and Traeger (2014) and van der Ploeg (2014) . 13 Responses with a linear hazard hardly differ from those with a quadratic hazard function.
marginal to raising-the-stakes damages. Once the calamity has struck, damages are higher and after-calamity welfare is lower so that the raising-the-stakes component of the carbon price is big. This in itself curbs carbon emissions and lessens the need for correction of marginal global warming damages. Before the calamity a small precautionary return is required and thus the target capital stock is a little higher than in the naive outcome (despite the higher carbon price). The precautionary return is only small because the shock to total factor productivity induced by the shock to climate sensitivity is not so big. Just as with the total factor productivity shocks, the carbon stock drops after the calamity. But the after-calamity temperature is now higher than with the productivity shock presented in table 2. Table 3 also shows the effects of a hazard of a 20% increase in the carbon stock. There is little precautionary saving with almost no effect on the rate of consumption and the carbon tax is small (17 $/tCO2) as it is a recoverable catastrophe rather than a permanent regime shift. The carbon stock and global warming are cut somewhat below the naive outcome (1490 instead of 1502 GtC). Both carbon and climate sensitivity catastrophes are less imminent than a productivity catastrophe resulting from, say, a reversal of the Gulf Stream and will typically be less abrupt as they may take centuries to have their full impact (e.g., Lenton and Ciscar, 2013; Lontzek et al., 2013) .
Finally, Before the calamity strikes, the risk-averting components of the price of carbon are tiny as the damages done by the catastrophe are temporary. Comparing with the naive outcome, the raising-the-stakes component takes over most of the marginal damages of the price of carbon, as we have also seen for the shock in climate sensitivity. There is substantial accumulation of capital before the calamity strikes with an impending capital disaster but unsurprisingly hardly any for an impending carbon stock disaster.
Conclusion
Climate change will probably manifest itself in the future as a regime shift in the climate system resulting from a climate tipping point (Lenton and Ciscar, 2013) . This means that the potential shock to the economy becomes an important driver of the social cost of carbon. It has also been argued that spending money now to slow down global warming should be conceptualized primarily as an issue about how much insurance to buy to offset the small chance of a ruinous catastrophe (Weitzman, 2007) .
We have taken up these challenges by analysing the optimal reactions to a tipping point which becomes more imminent with global warming.
The most striking result is that both precautionary capital accumulation and a price of carbon are needed. Precautionary saving may be picked up by the market but if not, a capital subsidy is needed. More capital is required to be prepared for the shock and to smooth consumption over time and less fossil fuel use is required to curb the risk of catastrophe. In combination with the standard Pigouvian price of carbon, this carbon price becomes even higher because the regime shift also increases the marginal cost of fossil fuel emissions after the shock. Higher intertemporal substitution or lower risk aversion and intergenerational inequality lower both the price of carbon and precautionary accumulation of capital.
Regime shifts are characterized in our analysis as structural shocks to total factor productivity or to climate sensitivity. We show that the effects on optimal policy are 20 much larger than in case of shocks to the capital stock or the stock of atmospheric carbon which only set back growth temporarily and do not affect the steady state of the economy. Hence, there is less need for optimal policy to curb the risk of tipping.
Another implication is that a constant marginal hazard rate requires a balanced package of precautionary saving and pricing carbon. However, for an increasing marginal hazard rate a higher carbon price is needed so that the stock of atmospheric carbon is kept down and precautionary accumulation of capital can be more modest.
Hence, if climate change is still far away but approaches more rapidly when the globe warms up, optimal climate policy requires a high price of carbon.
Our results highlight the importance of a price of carbon to curb the risk of catastrophe and precautionary capital accumulation to be better prepared when disasters strike. Our illustrative calculations indicate that the catastrophe parts and especially the riskaverting part of the price of carbon are substantial compared with the carbon taxes based on only marginal damages (e.g., Nordhaus, 2008; Golosov et al., 2014 ).
Our conclusion is that destruction of non-recoverable factors of production by climate catastrophes requires urgent action both to mitigate the risks of such actions occurring and to be better prepared for them. 14 Our illustrative calculations suggest that conventional marginal global warming damages necessitate a global price of carbon of 15 $/tCO2. 15 Allowing for an impending negative shock of 20% to total factor productivity with an expected arrival in 40 years, and falling to 15 years as the carbon stock doubles, boosts this figure to 55 or 71 $/tCO2 for a linear or quadratic hazard function, respectively. In addition, a precautionary return of about 1% per annum induces capital accumulation of 30% and 23%, respectively. A -10% shock halves the precautionary returns and requires a global carbon price of 30 to 40 $/tCO2. Halving the hazard rates for any given carbon stock hardly changes the required carbon price, but does diminish the precautionary return considerably to 0.16% per annum.
Catastrophic shocks to recoverable factors of production such as the capital stock are only temporary and thus require much less action. On the other hand, catastrophes that 21 unleash hitherto dormant positive feedback loops in the carbon cycle may need much more risk-averting action to prevent runaway global warming from occurring.
Catastrophes might resonate more with policy makers to convince them of the need to implement ambitious climate policy. However, as argued by Lenton and Ciscar (2013) , more research with climate scientists is needed to improve information on the different types of productivity, capital, carbon and climate sensitivity catastrophes that can occur and the different hazard and marginal hazard rates of such disasters. We also need to be more precise about how long it will take before the impact of the catastrophe is fully felt and adopt our analysis for this purpose (cf., Lontzek et al., 2014) . For example, drops in total factor productivity resulting from reversal of the Atlantic Meriodonal Overturning Circulation may take a century, full disappearance of the Greenland or the West Antarctic Ice Sheet may take as long as three centuries, and release of permafrost may take close to a century. Desertification of agricultural land may take many decades before its full impact is felt. Future research is thus needed on the nature of catastrophes, their hazard rates and their dependence on global warming and the time it takes to have their effect, and how these affect the optimal policy prescriptions for dealing with climate tipping points.
As a consequence, the second part of (11) and (12) become: Figure A1 indicates that a bigger climate sensitivity of 4 (dashed lines) than our benchmark of 3 (solid lines) leads, for a given carbon stock, to bigger damages, with the hazard function unaltered. A sudden increase in climate sensitivity thus leads to a tougher challenge. Doubling the initial carbon stocks induces a 2.0% drop in total factor productivity if climate sensitivity is 3 and a 3.4% drop if climate sensitivity is 4.
Appendix 5: Adaptation capital
The risk of a tipping point induces precautionary capital accumulation so as to be prepared when the shock hits. Alternatively, one can invest in specific adaptation capital L (e.g., seawalls, storm surge barriers, dune reinforcement and creation of marshlands as protection to sea level rises, crop relocation, diversifying tourist attractions, adjusting rail and roads to cope with warming and drainage). 16 Adaptation capital L reduces the shock, so () L
 
with (L) < 0. Suppose both types of capital are ex ante perfect substitutes and have the same depreciation rate, δ. We assume a "putty-clay" technology: from the tip onwards, L is constant as there is no need to cover for depreciation and L cannot be turned ex post into productive capital.
We ignore marginal damages, so after-calamity does not depend on the carbon stock.
The right-hand side of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation becomes
, ( ) ,
with the condition for the optimal stock of adaptation capital, Here we see that a bigger risk of catastrophe leads to more adaptation capital L. In general, the hazard rate increases with global warming in which case the optimal level of adaptation capital and the aggregate capital stock increase with the carbon stock.
17 Condition (A11) follows from ( 
